UDC 330.341.2

Zhurov Yu.V.¹ (Moscow, Russian Federation) – zhurov.yv@rea.ru; Koykova A.D.¹ (Moscow, Russian Federation) – koikova.a@edu.rea.ru; Solovey V.I.¹ (Moscow, Russian Federation) – solovei.v@edu.rea.ru

¹Plekhanov Russian University of Economics

Abstract. This study is motivated by the growth of investments in intangible assets (over 2.3 trillion rubles in the Russian Federation in 2024) and high transaction costs of commercializing intellectual activity results, which can account for up to 70% of intellectual property protection costs. The paper aims to substantiate an economic mechanism for choosing the IP protection regime (patent vs. know‑how) that minimizes transaction costs and maximizes innovation rent at different stages of the innovation cycle. The methodology includes neo‑institutional analysis, property rights theory (R. Coase, A. Alchian, H. Demsetz), transaction cost theory (O. Williamson) and economic contract analysis. A mathematical formalization of the choice based on comparing present costs and probabilistic losses is proposed. Scientific novelty lies in the economic (rather than legal) approach to the choice of IP regime: in contrast to existing works focused on legal or managerial logic, an economic mechanism is developed that links the choice of IP regime to the comparative effectiveness of reducing the transaction costs of specification, protection and disclosure of information. The results show that the choice of IP regime affects transaction costs, participant incentives, innovation rent appropriation, entry barriers, contract structure and commercialization speed. Quantitative criteria are introduced: the coefficient of comparative patent efficiency (Eₚ), expected losses from opportunism (L_opp), and transaction duration (T_trans). The application area includes corporate innovation management and public IP policy.

Keywords: intellectual property, transaction costs, property rights theory, patent, know‑how, innovation rent, economic contract theory, institutional economics, innovation commercialization.

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For citation: Zhurov, Yu. V., Koikova, A. D., & Solovey, V. I. (2026). Institutions of distribution and protection of rights to innovation results as a mechanism for reducing firm’s transaction costs. CITISE, 3, 277–286. (In Russian).